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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the expectations formation and forecasting of vehicle demand in 
Singapore under the vehicle quota system.  Under the system, a car buyer must first 
bid for a vehicle license in monthly auctions in order to purchase a new car. We 
construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis that past bid distributions of the 
license auctions contain information that car buyers can use to update their 
expectations about the intensity of market demand, forecast the license premiums and 
formulate their bidding strategies in future auctions.  Our empirical analysis indicates 
that past bid distributions have a good degree of predictive power for the license 
premiums. 
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1. Introduction  
Auctions are used in the allocation of a wide variety of goods and services, including 
treasury bills, art and antiques, oil drill leases, fishing rights, houses, agricultural produce, 
radio spectrum and 3G mobile phone licenses.  In the case of Singapore, monthly auctions of 
quota licenses have been conducted since May 1990 to allocate the rights to own motor 
vehicles.  Governments also frequently procure supplies and services through tenders and 
award contracts to the lowest-cost bidder.  Most auctions are also not one-off affairs. In fact, 
like the vehicle quota license auctions in Singapore, many auctions take place regularly and 
involve the sale of multiple units of the same object.  Other examples of repeated auctions 
with multiple units of identical or closely substitutable objects are auctions of flowers (e.g. in 
The Netherlands), wine auctions (e.g. in France and California, USA), auctions of real estate 
properties (e.g. New Zealand) as well as Treasury bills (e.g. in USA) and initial public 
offerings (e.g. Taiwan).  Many participants in these auctions interact repeatedly, and new 
players may enter the auctions while other players leave.   
In all these auctions, bidders must form expectations about the market demand for the 
objects to be allocated, the consequent competition that they will face in the auction, as well 
as forecast the winning bids.  Although the underlying economic conditions fluctuate over 
time and the set of participants in each auction may vary, participants in these repeated 
auctions can often gather useful information from the bid distributions and winning bids of 
preceding auctions.  Based on this information, they will update their beliefs about current 
and future market demands, the competition they face, as well as revise their expectations 
about the valuation of the objects to be allocated.  
A rich theoretical literature on auctions, developed since the 1980s (see Klemperer 
(1999) for a recent survey), had furthered our knowledge of the optimal design of auctions, 
the properties of different auction formats and their welfare implications, the strategic 
interactions between auction participants and  the optimal bidding strategies they will use to 
compete effectively.  In particular, Milgrom and Weber, (1982) has shown that when bidders’ 
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valuations are affiliated,1 it is in the interest of the seller  to make available as much relevant 
information as possible before each auction, as this is likely to raise expected proceeds from 
the auction, as bidders utilize the information optimally in formulating their expectations.   
In the context of repeated affiliated-value auctions such as Singapore’s vehicle 
license auction, the bid distributions of previous auctions contain useful information about 
bidders’ expectations about market demands and trends.  This information could still be 
relevant in future license auctions, particularly if they point to a trend in the demand for new 
vehicles.  While the theory behind affiliated-value auctions is well established, and 
experimental research have illuminated the strategic aspects of these type of auctions and the 
“winners’ curse” phenomenon (see for instance, Kagel and Levin (1986), Levin, Kagel and 
Richard (1996)), there have been few empirical studies on the expectation formation process 
and the use of past bid distributions in forecasting market demand and the market-clearing 
bids.  This provides the motivation for this paper, which aims to study the expectations 
formation process and the forecasting of vehicle demand under Singapore’s vehicle quota 
license auction, which is an example a repeated multiple-object uniform price auction with a 
second-price bidding format.   
Our objective in this paper is to study how car buyers, or more commonly, 
distributors acting on behalf of car buyers, bid for the licenses and whether it is possible to 
forecast quota license premiums (i.e. the lowest successful bids) with good accuracy and  
improve one’s success of securing a vehicle license.   To our knowledge, the present study is 
the only one of its kind in forecasting vehicle demand in the setting of a quota license auction. 
Our study focuses on the period from September 1994 to December 1997 (altogether 
40 auctions), when data on the bid distributions for the sealed-bid auction format was 
available.  The sealed-bid auction format in Singapore’ vehicle license auction offers us a 
unique opportunity to study the expectations formation and demand-forecasting game as 
                                                 
1 Roughly speaking, bidders’ private information or signals are affiliated if a high value of one bidder’s 
signal makes high values of other bidders’ signals more likely. 
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participants in the repeated auctions use bid distributions of previous auctions to update their 
valuations and predict future license premiums.2  
Under the current online-open bid format (since May 2002), each license auction 
takes place over three days at the beginning and middle of each calendar month, and bidders 
can see, in real time, the market clearing bids at each point in time before the auction closes.  
Bidders can update their valuations in real time, enter or drop out of the auction, or revise 
their bids.  However, bidders with valuations lower than the market clearing bids will not 
enter the license auction.  Thus, the bid distributions for an open auction format are 
necessarily truncated distributions since they do not capture the data from the participants 
who did not enter the auction.  Understanding the expectations formation and demand-
forecasting process in the open-bidding auction is a much more challenging task.   
Our analysis is as follows.  We construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis 
that in Singapore’s vehicle license auction, past bid distributions contain significant 
information that bidders can use to revise their expectations about the intensity of market 
demand (as measured by the ratio of available monthly quota over the number of bidders 
participating in the auction), forecast the quota license premiums and formulate their bidding 
strategies.  The results of our econometric analysis support this hypothesis.  Specifically, we 
found that the mean, variance and ratio of quota over number of submitted bids of past bid 
distributions have a good degree of predictive power for quota license premiums.  
The plan for the rest of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief description 
of the main features of Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System.  In Section 3, we discuss the main 
elements of game-theoretic modeling of the vehicle quota license auctions.  This forms the 
basis for the construction of an econometric model in Section 4 to study the expectations 
formation and demand forecasting process in the vehicle license auction.  While our 
econometric model is applied to the vehicle license auctions in Singapore, the methodology of 
                                                 
2 Although data from January 1998 to June 2001 are available, we have chosen not to include them in 
the study,  for the reasons that we discussed in Section 4.   
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our model is broadly applicable to auctions of other types of goods in a sealed-bid format.  
We conclude our study in Section 5 with a discussion and comments on future research. 
 
2. Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System  
The Vehicle Quota System (“VQS”) was implemented in May 1990 to complement 
existing fiscal tax measures to control the growth in vehicle population.  Under the VQS, each 
car buyer must first bid for a vehicle quota license – officially referred to as the Certificate of 
Entitlement (or more commonly, COE).  Each quota license allows a vehicle to be on the road 
for ten years.  At the end of this period, the owner may either de-register the vehicle or renew 
the license for a further five-year or ten-year period, by paying a “prevailing quota license 
premium”.  Over the past decade, there have been a number of studies that assessed the 
mechanics, equity and efficiency of the VQS (among them, Phang (1993), Koh and Lee 
(1994), Chin and Smith (1997), Chu (1998, 2002), Chu and Goh (1997), Toh and Phang 
(1997), Tan (2001), and Koh (2003)).     
Until June 2001, the allocation of vehicle quotas licenses was conducted via a sealed-
bid auction where successful bidders pay the lowest successful bid.3 Following a government 
review of the VQS, the auction format switched to an online open-bid format in several 
phases, beginning in June 2001. Since May 2002, there are two auctions conducted twice a 
month (the beginning and the middle of the month).  The bidding is carried out online, at the 
website of the Land Transport Authority of Singapore (“LTA”), at http://www.lta.gov.sg.   
 Every quota year (beginning in May), the quota for new motor vehicles is determined 
in accordance with a targeted rate of growth in the motor vehicle population, and taking into 
account the projected de-registration of vehicles.  At present, the LTA releases on its website  
the exact calculations for the target vehicle population and the number of vehicle quota 
                                                 
3 When there are many participants in the auctions, the distribution of bids is approximately 
continuous, so that the lowest successful bid will be close to the highest rejected bid.  Hence, the 
vehicle quota license auction is approximately a second-price auction format. 
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licenses  available for auction each month.  The projected quota for each category is allocated 
almost equally over twelve months. 
 Motor vehicles are classified into several categories under the VQS, with a separate 
license quota for each category.  Prior to 1999, there were seven quota categories.4  To allow 
changes in consumer tastes to influence the composition of the vehicle population over time, 
25% of the deregistered vehicles in each category are allotted to an “Open” category, where 
the quota licenses can be used to register motor vehicles belonging to any of the quota 
categories. “Open” category licenses are transferable once.  Beginning in July 2001, bidding 
for quota licenses shifted gradually from a sealed-bid format to an on-line open-bid format.   
    In each quota license auction, each bidder is allowed to submit only one bid in one 
category, and must furnish a deposit equal to half the bid amount.  Successful bidders pay the 
lowest winning bid, and must pay the difference between the winning bid and their deposit at 
the time of the registration of the vehicle.  Although the license auctions are over-subscribed 
(with one exception, to be discussed in Section 4.1), not all the quota licenses are allocated in 
each auction.  This is because there is no tie-breaking procedure for identical bids at the cutoff 
level.  These bids are treated as unsuccessful bids, and the license premium for the auction is 
the next higher bid. The unallocated licenses are carried over to the next monthly auction in 
the same category. 
As originally conceived, each car buyer is supposed to bid for a quota license directly 
and then places an order for a car when a license is obtained.  In practice, it is the car 
distributors that bid for the licenses on behalf of car buyers, since car distributors typically 
                                                 
4 When the VQS was first introduced in 1990, there were 7 categories; these are: Category 1 for cars of 
1000 cc and below; Category 2 for cars of  1001-1600 cc and below, and taxis; Category 3 for cars of 
1601-2000 cc and below; Category 4 for cars above 2000 cc; Category 5 for goods vehicles and buses; 
Category 6 for motorcycles; Category 7, an “Open” category for registration of all types of vehicles.  
An eighth category for “weekend cars” was introduced in May 1991, but discontinued in September 
1994.  In May 1999, Categories 1 and 2 were merged into one category, as was the case for Categories 
3 and 4.  The other categories were unchanged.   
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offer bundled packages where the quoted car price already includes a “subsidized” quota 
license, sometimes with provisions to raise the car price if there are substantial fluctuations in 
the license premiums.  These pricing policies discriminate against buyers who obtain quota 
licenses on their own, rather than through the distributors.  In fact, some car distributors 
would not entertain car buyers who attempt to bid and obtain quota licenses on their own.  
 
3. Modeling the Vehicle License Auction 
To provide the setting for the econometric model we shall use in this study, we first 
discuss the main elements of game-theoretic models of the vehicle license auctions.5  The 
vehicle license auction is an example of an affiliated-values repeated multiple-object auction 
(for a precise definition of affiliated values, see Milgrom and Weber (1982)).  Therefore, the 
valuations of bidders and the sealed bids that they submit have a common-value element.  The 
participants in these auctions form expectations about the intensity of demand in each auction.  
The objective is to submit bids higher than the forecast quota license premiums. 
Consider the demand problem from the perspective of car distributors.  We note that 
in practice, car distributors typically act on behalf of car buyers to bid for quota licenses.  As 
car distributors share a common objective to generate sales while minimizing cost of 
operations (particularly if they had to offer bundled packages with “guaranteed” quota 
licenses), their valuations of the quota licenses – and the bids they submit as a result – will be 
affected by each other’s expectations.  More generally, for all bidders in the license auction, 
their valuations of licenses will be influenced by the intensity of market demand in the current 
auction, as well as by the anticipated demands in future auctions.  Finally, to the extent that 
car buyers can choose the timing of their car purchases, the quota licenses in different 
                                                 
5  Formal game-theoretic models of Singapore’s vehicle quota license auctions can be found in Koh and 
Lee (1994), Tan (2001) and Koh (2003).  Each of these studies focuses on a different aspect of the 
vehicle quota license auction, and formulates different models to address the issues.  In particular, Koh 
(2003) constructed a model to study the impact of the vehicle quota system on the market competition 
in the car distributorship industry. 
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auctions are substitutable; hence, bidders’ valuations and their resultant demands in each 
license auction would be influenced by the license premiums in earlier auctions.  Since 
bidders also have the option not to participate in the current auction but in future auctions, 
their valuations in the current auction will be affected by their expectations and forecasts of 
future license premiums, as well as their beliefs regarding the expectations of rival bidders 
concerning future market demands.  Finally, the beliefs and forecasts of the auction 
participants may be based on both public and private information.    
In summary, each bidder will possess private information that influences his 
expectations of market demand and his valuation of the vehicle licenses. He may also acquire 
additional information, as well as use the relevant public information to revise his valuations 
and formulate his bidding strategy.  Specifically, for the prospective car buyer, the private 
information will include the stream of utilities he can derive from owning and using a 
passenger car.  He may also have some private information regarding future car demand. For 
the company executive, his private information will include the vehicle’s contribution to the 
company’s business operations, as well as his expectations of future demand for licenses, etc.  
For car distributors, the private information that affects their valuations would include the 
companies’ profit margins, the competition’s car pricing policies, and forecasts of future car 
demand.  For a speculator who bids in the “Open” category, and who is only interested in 
reselling the quota license in the secondary market, the private information would include the 
level of demand for “Open” category transferable licenses as well as his forecasts of 
secondary market prices.  Finally, if a bidder decides to bid for a non-transferable quota 
license in a specific category, rather than buy a transferable (“Open” category) license, the 
bidder’s private information would include his forecast about the license premiums in the 
resale market for Open category licenses.   
Besides private information, auction participants have access to public information 
(e.g. news reports about economic outlook, announcements of changes in government 
policies, etc) that may also affect their expectations about market demand and valuations of 
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the licenses.  For instance, the number of quota licenses available in each auction is public 
knowledge, since this is determined a year in advance and made public on the website of the 
LTA.  Changes in future license quotas will lead to revision in the expectations of future 
quota premiums, and this will affect bidders’ decision to participate in a particular auction – 
either postponing participation or bringing forward the participation.  Auction participants can 
also evaluate the bid distributions of previous auctions, which are made available by the LTA, 
to learn about the valuations of other bidders.  Such ex-post public information regarding 
competition in the license auctions may provide useful information about the competition in 
subsequent auctions, particularly if it points to a market trend.  Another piece of public that 
may be relevant is the price of “Open” category quota licenses in the secondary market.  
Conditional on the public information and their private information, each bidder 
forms expectations about the intensity of demand, calculates his valuations for the quota 
licenses in the current auction, and formulates his bidding strategies accordingly.  It is well-
established in auction theory that Nash equilibrium bidding strategies exist for auction games 
with affiliated valuations: each player’s optimal strategy is to bid as if as he is the marginal 
successful bidder (see, for instance, Milgrom and Weber (1982), Koh and Lee (1994) and 
Klemperer (1999)), based on his beliefs and expectations of market demand.   For our study, 
the practical implication of the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in Singapore’s market for 
new motor vehicles is that bidders in the vehicle license auction will try to forecast the 
winning bid and bid higher than the forecast bid.  Furthermore, bidders will optimally use the 
information contained in previous bid distributions to form their expectations about car 
demand and the degree of competition in the current auction (specifically, the number of 
bidders, as well as the expected value of the rivals’ bids)  in order to forecast the license 
premium (i.e. the lowest successful bid).    
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4. Econometric Analysis 
In this section, we present an econometric model to study the expectations formation 
and demand forecasting process in Singapore’s vehicle license auctions.  In particular, we 
seek to understand whether it is possible to forecast the intensity of market demand as well as 
the quota license premiums in each auction, utilizing the information contained in previous 
license auctions.  If there are significant learning effects, the informational content of bid 
distributions will have a high degree of predictive power for future car demands and the quota 
license premiums. 
 The following notations will be used in our econometric model:  Pt = quota license 
premium (i.e. the lowest successful bid), Qt = available licenses in the quota, and Bt = number 
of bids submitted. For a randomly selected participant in the license auction (which, in our 
sample, was conducted on a monthly basis), we denote his bid by tP .  Since each bidder 
cannot observe the bids of other participants in the sealed-bid auction, each bidder may 
consider his bid tP  as a random variable with mean tµ  and variance 2tσ .  We allow tµ  and 
variance 2tσ  to vary over time, in order to reflect changes in the bidding strategies of existing 
participants (say, in response to new public information or new private information ) or the 
participation of new bidders in the license auctions, as well as changing demand conditions. 
As the number of successful bids is fixed at Qt, the available monthly quota, we 
define /t t tR Q B=  as the quota-bid ratio.  This measures the market demand for vehicles and 
the resultant degree of competition in the current auction.  Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the 
inverse of the quota-bid ratio (i.e. 1/ /t t tR B Q= ) for the four passenger car categories 
(Categories 1 to 4) and the Open Category (Category 7).   It is clear from Figure 1 that the 
bid-quota ratios are volatile, and appear to be correlated across different categories.  Also, the 
bid-quota ratios are generally above 100%, indicating oversubscription in the license auctions.   
By construction, the probability of successfully obtaining a vehicle license is given by 
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 ( )Pr t tP P≥  = t
t
Q
B
= tR                                                     (1)  
For our analysis, we shall assume that the standardized bid, ( ) /t t tP µ σ− , has a distribution 
function F( . ). Therefore, we obtain the following relationship:  
 ( )Pr t tP P<  =  Pr  t t t t
t t
P µ P µ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞− −<⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠

                      (2) 
       =  t t
t
P µF
σ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  =  1 tR−  
Taking the inverse transformation, we obtain 
       t t
t
P µ
σ
−   = 1(1 )tF R− −                         (3) 
so that  
      1(1 )t t t tP µ σ F R
−= + −                      (4) 
The expression in (4) shows that the market-clearing quota license premium depends on (i) 
the mean tµ and variance 
2
tσ  of the distribution of the submitted bids, (ii) the distribution 
function F( . ), and finally (iii) the quota-bid ratio Rt, which reflects the intensity of market 
demand in each quota license auction. 
As the various quantities in the econometric model are not observable ex-ante, our 
approach is to use proxies in its empirical estimation.   Firstly, we approximate 1( . )F −  by a 
low-order polynomial.  For our purpose, it suffices to approximate 1(1 )tF R
− −  by a quadratic 
function in Rt.6  Secondly, we use 1tR −  as the proxy for Rt.  This is in line with our theoretical 
hypothesis that bidders would use the bid distributions of previous auctions in formulating 
their expectations and beliefs in future auctions.  Thirdly, we assume that the mean tµ of the 
bid distribution in the current auction is the quota license premium in the preceding auction, 
i.e., 1t tµ P−= . This is a practical assumption and corresponds to the situation where each 
bidder believes that expected value of the rivals’ submitted bids is the quota license premium 
                                                 
6  Note that this approximation is local to the sample data that we consider in our study.  
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of the preceding auction.7  Finally, we use the moving average of the standard deviation of 
the bid distributions of the three preceding auctions, denoted by ( )* 1 1 2 3 / 3t t t tσ σ σ σ− − − −= + + , 
as the proxy for tσ . The choice of 
*
1tσ −  is to smooth out the effect of fluctuations in the bid 
distributions caused by the participation of speculators who submit random bids to try their 
luck and other short-term market perturbations.8   
With these assumptions and proxy measures in mind for the estimation process, we 
will consider the following regression equation9 
 * * 21 0 1 1 1 2 1 1t t t t t tP P β β σ R β σ R− − − − −− = + +                      (5) 
Thus, we obtain an econometric model with the first-order price differences ( )1t tP P−−  as the 
dependent variable.   
Our preliminary data analysis indicates that the data series of the quota license 
premiums Pt for all the quota license categories possess a unit root and are therefore non-
stationary.  The non-stationary property of Pt is not surprising, since the vehicle quota system 
has undergone different policy changes and the underlying economic environments have also 
changed significantly between May 1990 and December 1997.   By contrast, we have found 
that the data series of the price differences ( )1t tP P−− are stationary. (The details will be given 
in Section 4.2.) Hence, for the purpose of uncovering the learning and expectations formation 
processes in the quota license auctions, our approach of modeling the price difference of the 
license is appropriate.    
                                                 
7   For Categories 1 and 7, which we will discuss in Section 4.2, the correlations between tµ  and 1tP−  
are 0.93 and 0.91, respectively.  Thus, this assumption is justified statistically. 
8  Other moving-average orders have been considered in the empirical analysis. The three-month 
moving average, however, provides the best results for the regression analysis.   
9  Note that an explanatory variable * 1tσ −  may be included in the regression due to the constant term in 
the quadratic approximation of 1( . )F − .  However, the variable * 1tσ − has been found to be statistically 
insignificant, due the presence of multicollinearity, and is therefore excluded in the regression analysis. 
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4.1 Auction Data 
For our study, data on license premiums, the monthly quota, the number of submitted 
bids, from May 1990 onwards, were obtained from LTA’s website (at http://www.lta.gov.sg).  
However, data on bid distributions in the sealed-bid license auctions were available only from 
September 1994 to June 2001 (when the auction format switched to an online open-bidding 
format).  This information was previously disseminated primarily to car distributors and the 
motoring associations (such as the Automobile Association of Singapore and the Motor 
Traders Association of Singapore), and is not available on LTA’s website.   
Unfortunately, the bid distribution data that was disseminated were not individual 
bids, but bids grouped and summarized into bands of price relatives above and below the 
market-clearing bids (see Figure 2 for a sample of the bid distributions).  Thus, the bid 
distribution data are somewhat less informative that what we would have liked. Nonetheless, 
the available information suffices for our purpose of calculating the means and standard 
deviations in the license auctions.  
Our study focuses on the period from September 1994 to December 1997 (altogether 
40 auctions).  While bid distribution data from January 1998 to June 2001 are available, we 
have elected not to use these data for the following reasons.  From January 1998 onwards, our 
preliminary data analysis uncovered the persistent presence of lottery seekers (to be defined 
shortly) in all the categories of the quota license auctions.10  This occurred after the January 
1998 license auction for Category 3.  In that auction, there were only 315 bids for 336 
available licenses.  The resulting quota license premium was S$50 (the lowest ever), and this 
was the only time that the quota license auction was ever undersubscribed.  
The sharp drop in market demand for cars and the consequent under-subscription in 
the January 1998 Category 3 auction had to do with the events of December 1997. Then, 
                                                 
10 By lottery seekers, we refer to participants in the quota license auctions who submit bids that are 
unrealistically low, in the hope that if the auction is undersubscribed (i.e. fewer bidders than available 
licenses), they may be able to pick up a license at a bargain. 
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South Korea almost defaulted on its sovereign debt, as foreign capital retreated from Asian 
economies following the currency devaluations in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
that sparked Asian Financial Crisis in mid-1997. Although the International Monetary Fund 
pulled together a rescue debt-restructuring package over Christmas to stave off a potential 
sovereign debt default, consumer sentiment took a sharp dive across Asian economies. In 
Singapore, the sharp decline in consumer sentiment was the cause of the weaker participation 
in the quota license auctions. 
The occurrence of the S$50 license premium contrasted with a peak of S$95,000 (in 
November 1994) and prompted many lottery seekers to participate in the subsequent quota 
license auctions and try their luck.11  In turn, this led to the presence of a concentration of bids 
at the lower end of the bid distribution.   As is evident in Figure 1 in the Appendix, the bid-
quota ratios for all the passenger car categories shot up significantly after January 1998, and 
persisted for many months before subsidizing, but still remained above the levels of 
December 1997 and January 1998.  Since our objective in this paper is to study the formation 
of expectations in forecasting vehicle demand where the auction participants are bona fide car 
buyers (i.e. not lottery seekers), we restrict our sample to the period before the December 
1997 bidding.  
 
4.2 Research Findings 
 We apply the econometric model to all seven license categories for passenger cars, 
for the period September 1994 through December 1997.  To recapitulate, our hypothesis is 
that in Singapore’s vehicle quota license auction – an example of a repeated multiple-object 
auction where the objects have a common value to the bidders –  the bid distributions contain 
information for bidders to update their expectations about the intensity of market demand  
                                                 
11  Since the bidding format was a sealed-bid auction, bidders had no way of finding out that the 
January 1998 Category 3 auction was going to be undersubscribed. If they had known, more bids 
would have been submitted, or lower bids would have been submitted.   
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(i.e. tR  the quota-bid ratio), make forecasts about the vehicle license premiums and formulate 
their bidding strategies.   
This hypothesis is supported by our econometric analysis, which shows that the bid 
distributions of previous license auctions have a good degree of predictive power for license 
premiums.  We found that the predictive power appears to be the strongest for Category 1 and 
the Category 7 (the “Open” category), and weaker for the other categories.  In these two 
categories, we tallied a total of 62,549 bids for the 29,622 licenses available over 40 auctions. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the econometric analysis for Category 1 and Category 7.    
 
 
Table 1: Estimation of the Econometric Model 
 
 
 Category 
 Cat 1: 1000 cc and below  Cat 7: Open, Transferable  
0β  11306.96 (3.609) −4734.939 (−1.071) 
1β  −8.465 (−4.328) 3.451 (2.101) 
2β  9.639 (4.357) −5.189 (−2.887) 
R2 0.360 0.302 
Durbin-Watson 2.200 1.977 
ADF for tP  −1.9473 (0.3096) −2.2471 (0.1936) 
ADF for 1t tP P−−  −7.1255 (0.0000) −4.3167 (0.0015) 
No of Observations 37 37 
 
Notes:  ADF = augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic.  The null hypothesis for the ADF test is 
that there is a unit root. For the estimates of the parameters β, the figures in the parentheses 
are the t−ratios. For the ADF statistics, the figures in the parentheses are the p−values. 
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics show that tP  is non-stationary (as we 
discussed earlier), while the ( )1t tP P−−  series is stationary.12  The regression slope parameters 
are all significant at the 5 percent level.  Both regressions explain more than 30 percent of the 
variations in the quota license premiums.  For regressions based on price differences, the high  
R2  coefficient is quite remarkable, and supports our hypothesis that the bid distributions in the 
vehicle quota license auctions contain significant information for learning and expectations 
formation in subsequent auctions. 
We believe that the stronger results for these two categories are due to the fact that 
there is little substitution in demand for vehicles in these two categories, resulting in more 
stable distribution of the bids tP .  Category 1 is for passenger cars of 1000 cc and below.  
Prospective car buyers in this category are unlikely to switch to purchase a car in the other 
(more expensive) car categories if quota license premiums increased (as was the case during 
most of the period from 1994 to 1997).  However, for Categories 2 to 4, prospective car 
buyers have the option to switch to a lower (cheaper) car category if quota license premiums 
rose so much as to affect their overall budget for car purchase. In other words, there is a 
greater degree of substitutability in the other categories, so that the bid distributions are less 
stable than in Category 1.  In the case of Category 7, this is the category for transferable 
licenses, and the bidders who participate in this category are the car distributors.  Thus, the set 
of participants are stable over time.  In the Appendix, Figures 3 and 4 provide graphical 
representations of the key features of the vehicle quota license auctions for Categories 1 and 
7, respectively. 
From Table 1, we also note that the estimated values of 1β  and 2β  have opposite 
signs in the regressions for Categories 1 and 7.  Hence, the net effect of Rt−1 on the change in 
Pt is mixed. This conclusion is, however, not surprising.  First, an increase in Rt−1 would lead 
to a decline in Pt−1 (see equation (4)), which has the effect of encouraging more bidders to 
                                                 
12   See MacKinnon (1991) for the use of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
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participate in the auction.13 In other words, Bt is likely to increase.  As Bt increases, this 
causes Rt to decline and Pt to increase.  Second, when bidders form expectations for µt based 
on Pt−1, an increase in Rt−1 would reduce Pt−1 and µt, and hence Pt. As these two effects of Rt−1 
on Pt are in opposite directions, the net effect is uncertain. 
 
5. Summary and Discussion 
  The objective of this paper is to study the expectations formation and demand 
forecasting in Singapore’s vehicle license auction.  We construct an econometric model to 
demonstrate that in Singapore’s vehicle license auction, participants can improve their 
chances of success by utilizing the information in past auctions to formulate their bidding 
strategies.  Specifically, we show that the mean, variance and quota-bid ratios of preceding 
auctions have a significant degree of predictive power for forecasting vehicle demand. 
Although the data we used to calculate the means and standard deviations for our 
regression analysis was partially aggregated data  (as discussed in Section 4.1), the results – 
particularly for Categories 1 and 7 – support our hypothesis that past bid distributions contain 
useful information about other bidders’ private information that may continue to be relevant 
in the current auction.  This is because in repeated multiple-object auctions, the objects being 
auctioned (in this case, quota licenses) are substitutable across auctions, and therefore bidders 
should update their expectations about the intensity of market demand in the current auction 
and revise their valuations and bidding strategies accordingly.   
 The econometric model we describe in Section 4 is the simplest model for our 
analysis.  It is possible to refine the analysis further to strengthen the results, but the 
qualitative conclusions will remain unchanged.  One promising avenue to refine the model is 
to consider a simultaneous-equation estimation setup.  We noted in the discussion in Section 
4.2 that number of bidders and the lagged license premiums are negatively correlated.  A 
                                                 
13   The correlation between ( )1 2t tP P− −−  and ( )1t tB B −−  is  −0.70 for Category 1 and –0.59 for 
Category 7. 
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more sophisticated means to incorporate this relationship and study its effects on the 
regression model is to explicitly model this process together with the demand-forecasting and 
price formation process described in Section 4.   
Finally, we believe that our econometric analysis is applicable to a wider setting.  For 
instance, in countries such as New Zealand and Singapore, real estate properties or land 
parcels are sometimes sold via sealed-bid tenders, although the more commonly-used format 
is an open-bidding format.  In the case of government procurement, however, sealed-bid 
tender is the predominant format.  Although these auctions are, strictly speaking, not repeated 
multiple-object auctions, and the objects in one auction are not always perfectly substitutable 
with those in subsequent auctions, they do share the same characteristics that the same set of 
players interact repeatedly in successive auctions, and valuations are affiliated across bidders. 
Therefore, it is likely that learning effects are present in the price formation process of these 
other auctions, as bidders seek to infer from past distributions the valuations of other players, 
the private information they may possess, and then revise their own beliefs and expectations 
accordingly.   
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Figure 1: Bid-Quota Ratios: May 1990 to April 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The Average Bid/Quota Ratio is the average for Categories 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7. 
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Figure 2: An Illustration of the Bid Distribution in Singapore’s Vehicle Quota Auction 
 
Category 7, March 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:    1.    The range of bid amounts is in increment/decrement of 10% from the Quota  
         Premium (S$45,002) 
 
2. The original source of the data is the Land Transport Authority of Singapore.  
       The data is no longer available on its website.   
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Figure 3:  Vehicle Quota License Auction in Category 1 
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Figure 4:  Vehicle Quota License Auction in Category 7 
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